This contribution applies Floyd’s just securitization theory (JST) to cybersecurity and develops an own version of JST focused on subsidiarity from the critical discussion of this application. Floyd’s JST pursues a subsidiary approach. It emphasizes that securitization is only legitimate if it has “a reasonable chance of success” to avert threats to the satisfaction of “basic human needs”. From this perspective, cyber-securitization would be only legitimate if it protects critical infrastructure, which is a too narrow scope. Whilst Floyd’s JST focuses exclusively on permissibility and needs instead of rights, I argue that there are cases in which states’ compliance with Human Rights requires the guarantee of cybersecurity, most importantly regarding the human right to privacy. Furthermore, my version of JST strengthens the principle of subsidiarity, in the sense that stakeholders directly affected by a threat should participate in securitization. In order to strengthen a kind of subsidiarity focused on the private sector, I argue for the legitimacy of private active self-defence in cyberspace and emphasize the importance of a ‘whole-of-society approach’ involving digital literacy a
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