How do policy tool combinations drive the construction of public health technology R&D alliances?

To effectively respond to public health emergencies, establishing an efficient technology R&D alliance is critically important. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, pharmaceutical enterprises, and academic and research institutions to examine how a combination of supply-side, demand-side, and environmental-side policy tools drives the formation of such alliances. The findings reveal that demand-side government procurement exerts the strongest incentive effect on enterprise and institutional participation, outperforming supply-side and environmental-side measures. Furthermore, policy intensity exhibits a scientifically discernible threshold: excessive intervention may not only increase fiscal pressure on the government but also paradoxically reduce willingness to participate due to diminishing marginal returns. Consequently, optimizing the mix of policy tools and implementing differentiated, targeted incentives are essential for fostering high-efficiency public health technology R&D alliances. This study offers a dynamic analytical framework and evidence-based guidance for policymakers in designing effective collaborative