The analysis conducted in the article shows that the question of the ability of artificial intellectual systems to reproduce thinking, outlined by A. Turing in the middle of the 20th century, is not limited only by practical implementation, but rather exacerbates fundamental methodological, epistemological and ontological problems that concern the very understanding of the nature and structure of human intelligence and knowledge. This necessitates raising the question of the definition of the very concept of «intelligence». For this purpose, the author of the article appeals to the ancient heritage, namely, to the multi-valued term «Logos», introduced by Heraclitus. Heraclitus distinguishes two definitions of Logos: «Logos-word» and «Logos-law». Logos as a «word» is a sign, the name of an object that can be formalized and introduced as an element of a formal system, which will find its embodiment in the creation of formal symbolic systems (Aristotle’s logic). Such an understanding of Logos focuses on the analytically discrete properties of thinking. In Dreyfus’s terminology, «Logos-word» is designated as «Knowledge-That». At the same time, the understanding of Logos as a «law», «fa
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