F2D: Detection of resolver DNS hijacking based on filtration funnel strategy

Abstract In recent years, DNS hijacking represents a significant security threat to the infrastructure of the Domain Name System (DNS). A prevalent form of DNS hijacking involves exploiting open resolvers to manipulate DNS records. Such attacks undermine the availability and confidentiality of network services, posing serious risks to legitimate users. Current DNS hijacking detection methods tend to focus on specific domains, leveraging the unique characteristics of domain-specific hijacking to identify attacks. Consequently, these methods are often limited in applicability and may lack accuracy when dealing with diverse hijacking scenarios. Additionally, many existing approaches face challenges related to efficiency, making them less effective for long-term monitoring of hijacking activities. To address these challenges, this paper introduces an efficient detection method F2D tailored for general DNS hijacking. First, F2D uses an accurate and efficient filtration funnel strategy for targeted resolver hijacking detection. Second, two optimized detection algorithms are proposed for comprehensive filtration. Third, the method includes an efficient mechanism for iden