Corrosion Hammer: a self-activated bit-flip attack to the processing-in-memory accelerator

Abstract The Resistive Random-Access-Memory (ReRAM) crossbar-based Processing-In-Memory (PIM) accelerator shows great promise in accelerating neural networks (NNs). This technique boasts low energy consumption and exceptional performance in multiplication and accumulations (MAC) operations, making ReRAM-based PIM accelerators an ideal solution for intelligent computing in wearable and low-power mobile devices. However, security concerns related to PIM have not been adequately addressed. In this paper, we present a new attack framework called SolutionName for ReRAM-based PIM accelerators. SolutionName builds upon the Bit Flip Attack (BFA), a weight modification attack that manipulates the NN function by flipping specific bits in the deployed quantized NN model. Unlike previous BFA methods that require explicit memory fault injection techniques, such as Row Hammer, to modify sensitive bits in the victim NN, SolutionName implants the trojan during the hardware-software co-design phase and flips sensitive bits using read disturbance. Read disturbance is a common noise in ReRAM caused by normal read operations. This approach enables the trojan to b