ABSTRACT Nursing ethics has long drawn on established frameworks such as principlism, care ethics, and relational approaches to guide practice. While these models provide valuable direction, they often overlook how the intentional structure of action shapes ethical meaning in clinical encounters. This article argues that Anscombe's philosophy, particularly her work on intention and action, offers the conceptual tools to enrich nursing ethics by grounding moral significance in action‐guiding reasoning. Although her work has not been widely applied to nursing, it offers substantial potential to enhance ethical decision‐making, patient‐centered care, and holistic support. Drawing on her seminal text, Intention (1957), this paper examines Anscombe's concepts of intention, motives, and the distinction between intentional and non‐intentional actions, as well as intentional omissions. These ideas provide a foundation for understanding intention as action‐guiding reasoning rather than an internal mental state, an approach that deepens ethical reflection and promotes more intentional, virtuous nursing care. The paper also addresses Anscombe's rejection of the fact/value di
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